Monday, November 16, 2026

Indonesia may spend a demographic dividend it never banked


For two decades, Indonesia’s demographic arithmetic has been a source of national optimism. A swelling working-age population, a shrinking share of dependents and a still-small elderly cohort together promised a demographic bonus—the growth that arrives when a country has far more producers than mouths to feed. It is the engine beneath the “Golden Indonesia 2045” vision: the assumption that a young, expanding workforce will carry the country into high-income status before its population grows old.

A quieter demographic signal is flashing red: even as Indonesians' working-age share rises towards 2030, households are depleting savings rather than growing them. Bank Indonesia’s surveys through 2024 and 2025 have documented what has come to be called makan tabungan—eating into savings—as families dip into deposits for daily needs. The Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (LPS) savings index fell again in May 2025, with roughly three in ten respondents not saving at all. This puzzles demographers about the nature of saving.

In 1985, Franco Modigliani won the Nobel for his life-cycle hypothesis — first set out with Richard Brumberg in 1954—which held that people do not simply spend what they earn each year. They borrow when young, save through their prime working years, and draw on those savings in old age. Scaled up, the theory carries a striking implication: a country’s saving rate is written less by how wealthy it is than by how its people are distributed across the life-cycle. Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason later drew out a sequel—the “second demographic dividend,” set out in work published in 2006. If the first dividend is the mechanical rise in output per person, the second is subtler and not guaranteed: the wealth that prime-age workers accumulate as they anticipate old age. It materialises only where the age structure meets institutions—pensions, formal finance, functioning labour markets—that let the instinct to save harden into investable assets.

Set Indonesia’s numbers against that framework. The country’s aggregate saving is not, on its face, collapsing; national saving has held near a third of GDP, buoyed by firms and government. The alarm lies beneath the aggregate—in who is saving and in whether anything locks that saving away for old age. Three signals stand out, each a story about the population.

The demographic bulge has not become a saving bulge, as much of Indonesia’s working-age surge is among informal and underemployed workers with volatile incomes. About 60% are informal, with four-fifths of new jobs from the informal sector (Carnegie Endowment, 2025). The share of own-account workers rose from under 17% in 2016 to 23% in 2023, earning under Rp2 million monthly on average. Female labor-force participation remains near 53% (World Bank / Asia Times, 2026). A working-age population isn’t equivalent to a working one, and only a saving workforce yields the second dividend. Bank Indonesia’s 2024–2025 surveys show household savings declining to mid-teens and deposit growth slowing, with balances in accounts under Rp100 million dropping about 40% (Carnegie Endowment, 2025).

The second is that the savers themselves are disappearing. The middle class — the cohort with the surplus the life-cycle model assumes will be banked — is shrinking precisely as the arithmetic peaks. It has fallen from around 21 percent of the population in 2019 to roughly 17 percent by 2023 (Carnegie Endowment, 2025), and by a further 1.1 million people between 2024 and 2025 alone (BPS data compiled by the Mandiri Institute, 2025). The aspiring middle class and the economically vulnerable now make up close to half the country. A demographic dividend is only as strong as the households positioned to convert prime-age income into wealth, and that group is thinning, not growing.

The third is that the machinery meant to turn savings into old-age security barely exists. Formal pension coverage reaches only a minority of workers: some 30 million contribute to mandatory old-age savings, about one in six of the working-age population. Pension assets amounted to roughly 3.3 percent of GDP in 2022 — against about 65 percent in Malaysia and 85 percent in Singapore (AMRO, 2022 data). Contribution rates are among the lowest in the region. The oldest safety net of all, grown-up children supporting ageing parents, is fraying as families shrink and fertility settles near replacement. Indonesia is ageing faster than it is building the machinery to save for it: the share of Indonesians over 65 is set to double from about 7 percent today to 14 percent by 2050, and to reach a super-aged 20 percent by 2070 (UN projections).

Consumption and credit are absorbing what the dividend might have saved. Household borrowing has crept up—“paylater” balances climbed past US$1.8 billion in 2025, non-performing consumer loans rose through early 2025, and arrears on vehicle financing nearly doubled between 2018 and 2024 (Carnegie Endowment, 2025). When Indonesians reach for instalments to smooth daily spending, it signals that incomes are lagging aspirations, not that wealth is accumulating.

The stakes are set by the demographic clock. Indonesia’s window is finite—on current projections, it begins to close through the 2030s and 2040s. Unlike the first dividend, which the age structure delivers on its own, the second must be earned: by pulling women into quality work, by formalising jobs so wages leave a surplus, by building pension instruments that informal workers actually trust, and by monitoring the composition of household credit as closely as its growth. Indonesia still has demography on its side. What it risks is reaching the end of its most productive decades with little to show for them—having quietly consumed a dividend it never paused to bank.

 


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